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Distinction and Loss of Civilian Protection
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A. The Principle of Distinction

T

here are several cardinal principles lying at the root of the law of international armed conflict. Upon examination, none is more critical than the
"principle of distinction. "I Undeniably, this overarching precept constitutes an integral part of modern customary intem ational 1aw.2 lt is also reflected in Article 48
of the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions ofl949. entitled "Bask rule," which provides that "the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian
objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only
against military objectives. "3
As is dear from the text, the pivotal bifurcation is between civilians and combatants (and, as a corollary, between military objectives and civilian objects). It is
wrong to present the dichotomy, as the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) sometimes does,4 in the form of civilians versus members of the armed
forces. $ Apart from the fact that not every member of the anned forces is a combatant (medical and religious personnel are excluded),6 civilians who directly participate in hostilities lose their civilian status fo r such time as they are acting in this
fashion although they are not members of any anned forces (see infra Section B) .
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It is almost axiomatic that, as a rule, all enemy com batants can be lawfully attacked d irectly-at all tim es--during an internatio nal armed conflict. This can be
done whether they are advancing, retreating or remaining stationary, and, as discussed later in this article, whether they are targeted in groups or individually.?
There are, however, a n umber of caveats: (i) the attack must be carried out outside
neutral territory, (ii) it is not allowed when a ceasefire is in effect, (iii) no prohibited weapons may be used, (iv) no perfidious methods of war fare may be resorted
to, (v) combatants are not to be attacked once they become hors de combat (by choice
(surrendered personnel) or because they are wounded, sick or shipwrecked),8 and
(vi) the attack must not be expected to cause excessive injury to civilians.
The hallmark of civilian status in wartime is that, in contrast to combatants, civilians-as well as civilian objects--enjoy protection from attack by the enemy. Intentionally directing attacks against civilians (not taking direct part in hostilities)
or civilian objects is a war crime under Article 8(2)(b)(i)-(ii) of the 1998 Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court.9
The term "attack" in this context means any act of violence, 10 understood in the
widest possible sense (including a non -kinetic attack), as long as it entails loss of
life, physical or psychological injury, or damage to property. Attacks do not include
no n-forcible acts, such as non-injurious psychological warfare. The line of division
between what is permissible and what is not is accentuated by computer network
attacks (CNA) . These would qualify as attacks within the accepted definition only
if they engender-through reverberating effects-h uman casualties or damage to
property (it being understood that a completely disabled computer is also damaged
property).!1
It is illegal to launch an attack the primary purpose of which is to spread terror
among the civilian population.12 The prohibition is applicable even if the attacker
has every reason to believe that such a terror campaign will shatter the morale of
the civilian populatio n-so that the enemy's determination to pursue the armed
conflict will be eroded-and the war will be brought to a rapid conclusion (saving,
as a result, countless lives on both sides). n Yet, an important rider is in order. What
counts here is not the actual effect of the attack but its purpose or intent: an attack
is not forbidden unless terrorizing civilians is its primary aim.14 Nothing precludes
mounting an otherwise lawful attack against combatants and military objectives,
even if the net outcome (due to resonating "shock. and awe") is the collapse of civilian morale and the laying down of arms by the enemy.
The principle of distinction excludes not only deliberate attacks against civilians, but also indiscriminate attacks, i.e., instances in which the attacker does not
target any specific military objective (due either to indifference as to whether the
ensuing casualties will be civilians or combatants or, alternatively, to inability to
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control the effects of the attack).l; A leading example is the launching by Iraq of
Scud missiles against military objectives located in or near residential areas in Israel
in 1991, notwithstanding the built-in imprecision of the Scuds which made accuracy in acquiring military objectives virtually impossible (and, in the event, no military objective was struck).
In regular inter-State warfare-where asymmetrical warfare is not part of the
military equation-the prohibition of indiscriminate attacks is perhaps of even
greater practical import than that of the ban of direct attacks against civilians. The
reason is that, generally speaking, the armed forces of a civilized country are rarely
likely nowadays to target civilians with premeditation. However, the prospect of
the incidence of indiscriminate attacks-predicated, as it is, on lack of concern
rather than on calculation-is much higher. A commonplace illustration would be
a high-altitude air raid, carried out notwithstanding conditions of zero visibility
and malfunctioning instruments for identifying preselected military objectives.
Certainly, military training must tenaciously address the issue of indiscriminate attacks if they are to be eliminated.
The flip side of civilian objects (which are protected from attack) is military objectives (which are not). The authoritative definition of militaryob;ectives appears
in Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I:
Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects areconcerned,
military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature,location, purpose
or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circwnstances ruling at the time, offers a
definite military advantage. l6

This definition is very open ended, if only because every civilian object-not excluding even a hospital or a church-is susceptible to use by the enemy for military
purposes. Such use (or abuse) will turn even a hospital or a place of worship into a
military objective, exposing it to a lawful attack under certain conditions. The only
attenuating consideration is that, under Article 52(3) of Protocol I, in case of doubt
the presumption should be that such a place is actually used for the normal purposes to which it is dedicatedY
It fo llows that the key to robust civilian protection lies, perhaps, less in the fundamental requirement of concentrating attacks on identifiable military objectives
and more in the complementary legal condition of observing proportionality in
the effects of the attack. This means, as prescribed in Article 51(5)(b) of Protocol I,
that-when an attack against a military objective is planned-incidental losses to
civilians or civilian objects (usually called "collateral damage") must not be
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expected to be "excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated."18Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that it will cause
incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects which
would be d early excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated is a war crime under Artide 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court.19
The expectation of excessive incidental losses to civilians or damage to civilian
objects taints an attack as indiscriminate in character. Yet it must be borne in mind
that not every inconvenience to civilians ought to be considered relevant. In wartime. there are inevitable scarcities of foodstuffs and services. Indeed, food, dothing. petrol and other essentials may actually be rationed; buses and trains may not
run on time; curfews and blackouts may impinge o n the quality oflife; etc. These
do not count in the calculus of proportionality. Moreover, the military advantage
anticipated from an attack must be viewed in a rather holistic fashion : when a
large-scale attack is in progress. it is not required to assess every discrete segment in
isolation from the overall picture.2o
Undeniably, what is deemed excessive is often a matter of subjective appraisal,
which takes place in the mind of the beholder (always remembering that the appraisal must be done in a reasonable fashion ). The difficulty is that military advantage and civilian casualties are like the metaphorical apples and oranges: a
comparison between them is an art, not a science. Civilian losses can be counted,
civilian damage can be surveyed and estim ated, but how can you quantify a military advantage on a measurable scale? Additionally, since the entire process is a
matter of pre-attack evaluation and expectation, it must be acknowledged that it is
embedded in probabilities. What is to be done if "the probability of gaining the
military ad vantage and of affecting the civilian population is not 100 percent but
lower and different"?21
All the circumstances must be factored in. Thus, the bombardment of a hospital
or a church used by the enemy may be given a green light if the actual number of
patients or worshippers on site is negligible, whereas, should the numbers be disproportionate, the attack may have to be aborted. However, there is a difference
between the cases of. say, one mosque where the minaret is used by a single enemy
sniper and another serving as a command and control center of an armored division. Taking out the sniper must not entail a substantial civilian price tag, but the
elimination of a key command and control center is a different matter. It has to be
borne in mind that "excessive" is not interchangeable with "extensive." Some
scholars take that position,22 but it is based on a misreading of the text.23 If the strategic and military value of a military objective is exceedingly high, significant collateral civilian losses resulting from an attack m ay well be countenanced.
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Any planned attack-and any commensurate estimate of the number of civilians present in or near military objectives-must be based on up-to-date intelligence. The "fog of war" is such that mistakes are unavoidable in every sizable
military operation. When a legal analysis is made after the event, there is a built-in
temptation to scrutinize the situation with the benefit of hindsight. But this temptation must be strongly resisted. The proper question is not whether collateral
damage to civilians proved to be excessive in actuality: it is whether collateral damage could or should have been reasonably expected to be excessive at the time of
planning, ordering or carrying out the attack. A reasonable expectation has to be
linked to the data collated and interpreted at the time of action. Evidently, a valid
evaluation of the state of affairs must be based on information that is current and
not obsolete. If crucial information (say, about the absence of civilians from the vicinity of a military objective) is derived from a reconnaissance mission, the attack
should follow soon thereafter since a long interval may mean that the facts on the
ground have undergone a profound change. 24
Pursuant to Article 57(2)(a)(ii) of Additional Protocol I, those who plan or decide
on an attack must take all feasib le precautions (taking into account all circumstances prevailing at the time), if not to avoid altogether, at least to minimize incidental losses to civilians or civilian objects. 25 Yet the aspiration to minimize
collateral damage cannot trump all other military inputs. Minimize the costs to civilians, yes, but not at all costs to the attacking force. There is no obligation incumbent on the attacker to sustain military losses only in order to minimize incidental
losses to enemy civilians or civilian objects. "Survival of the military personnel and
equipment is an appropriate consideration when assessing the military advantage
of an attack in the proportionality context. "26
Minimizing incidental losses or injury to civilians can be accomplished through
the employment of precision-guided munitions (PGM )-where available-to target a military objective located in the midst of a densely populated residential area.
The use of PGM enables the strike to be surgical, with little collateral damage expected to the surrounding civilians or civilian objects. As pointed out by Michael
Schmitt, this is so not only because PGM are more accurate, but also because "the
explosive charge needed to achieve the desired result is typically smaller than in
their unguided counterparts. "21
In order to achieve the same goal of sparing civilians and civilian objects from
the effects of attacks, Article 57(3) of Protocol I sets forth that, if a choice is possible
among several military objectives for obtaining a similar military advantage, the
one expected to cause the least incidental civilian losses and damage should be selected.28 But, again, the unfortunate truth is that it is often impossible to detennine
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with any degree of credibility whether the elimination of diverse military objectives
would afford a similar military advantage.
Other feasible precautions include-if circumstances permit-the issuance of
effective advance warnings to civilians of an impending attack (in conformity with
Article 57(2)(c) of Additional Protocol 129) . All the same, circumstances do not always permit the issuance of such warnings. Otherwise, surprise attacks would have
had to be struck out of the military vocabulary.
"The law of armed conflict singles out for special protection certain specified
categories of civilians, either because they are regarded as especially vulnerable or
on account of the functions they perform. "30 The first category is illustrated by
women and children,3l and the second by civilian medical and religious personnel. 32 In the same vein, certain civilian objects-for instance, cultural property33 or
places of worship34-also enjoy special protection. But the special protection must
be looked upon as merely the icing on the cake: it adds some flavor but it does not
really affect the core. Some additional elements--enhancing the range of the protection-are brought into play, for the benefit of the selected persons or objects,
yet the most vital safeguards are granted to all civilians and civilian objects without
fail. There is also a proviso: protection (even special protection) may be lost as a result of a failure to meet prescribed conditions, as stipulated by the law of international armed conilict.

B. Direct Participation in Hostilities
Direct participation of a civilian in hostilities leads to loss of protection from attack
ofthe person concerned (within the temporal limits of the activity in question). As
promulgated in Article 51(3) of Protocoll, civilians enjoy a general protection
against dangers arising from military operations "unless and for such time as they
take a direct part in hostilities. "35 Occasionally, the reference is to "active" (instead
of "direct") participation in hostilities,36 and at times either adjective is deletedY
The bottom line is essentially the same:38 a person who takes part in hostilities loses
his protection. There is no doubt that, as held by the Supreme Court ofIsrael (per
President Barak) in the Targeted Killings caseof2006, this norm reflects customary
internationallaw. 39
There is a consensus that a civilian can be targeted at such time as he is taking a
direct part in hostilities.40 There is nevertheless a serious debate about taxonomy.
For my part, I believe that by directly participating in hostilities a person turns into
a combatant-indeed, more often than not, an unlawful combatant.'! On the
other hand, the ICRC, while conceding that "[IJoss of protection against attack is

188

Yoram Dinstein
clear and uncontested, "42 adheres to the view that the status of that person remains
one of a civilian.
The difference of opinion about status has a p ractical consequence only when
the person concerned is captured. 1 am inclined to think that, as an unlawful combatant, the person loses the general protection of the Geneva Conventions (except
in occupied territories) and only enjoys some minimal safeguards, in conformity
with hum an rights standards. The lCRC maintains that the general protection of
civilian detainees under Geneva Convention (IV) applies also to civilians directly
participating in hostilities. My own position is predicated on Article 5 of that Convention, whereby-other than in occupied territories-those engaged in hostilities
do not benefit from the privileges of the Convention, although they still have to be
treated with humanity and are entitled to a fair triaL43
The words "for such time" appearing in Article 51(3) of Protocol l raise serio us questions about their scope.44 The government of Israel has traditionally contended that these words do not reflect customary international law, but the
Supreme Court has utterly rejected that submission.45 The Court made it clear
that a civilian who o nly sporadically takes a direct part in hostilities does not lose
protection from attack on a permanent basis: once he disconnects himself from
these activities, he regains his civilian protection from attack;-46 (although he may
still be detained and prosecuted for any crime that he may have committed during his direct participation in hostilities 47 ) .
The desire to confine the exposure of the civilian who directly participates in
hostilities to a finite space oftime makes a lot of sense. It is worthwhile to remember that many a rmed forces in the world incorporate large components of reservists who are called up for a prescribed period and are then released from service. A
reservist is basically a civilian who wears the uniform of a combatant for a while
and is then cloaked again with the mantle of a civilian. Surely, for such time as he is
a combatant, a reservist can be attacked. Yet, before and after , qua civilian, he is exempt from attack. The same consideration should apply grosso modo to other types
of civilians turned combatants and vice versa.
There are two salient riders added to the general proposition bytbe jud gment in
the Targeted Killings case. The first is that the cycle of direct participation in hostilities comm ences at an early stage of preparation and deployment, continuing
throughout the e ngagement itself, to cover also the disengagement and return
phase;tSAlthough there are those who maintain that the expression "for such time"
should be construed strictly as encompassing only the engagement itself, this claim
is generally rejected.49 l (and others) take the position that, in demarcating the relevant time span in the course of which the person concerned is actually taking part
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in hostilities, it is permissible to go as far as reasonably possible both "upstream"
and "downstream" from the actual engagement.
The second rider is that while a person directly participating in hostilities more
than once may still revert to a civilian status during an interval, this cannot be
brought off when the hostile activities take place on a steadily recurrent basis with
brief pauses (the so-called "revolving door" phenomenon ).50 Those attempting to
be "farmers by day and fighters by night" lose protection from attack even in the
intermediate periods punctuating military operations. The same rationale applies
if an individual becomes a member of an organized anned group (which collectively takes a direct part in the hostilities): he would lose civilian protection for as
long as that membership lasts. In the locution of the Court, an organized armed
group becomes the "home" of the terrorist for whom a respite-interposing between acts of hostilities-merely means preparation for the next round. 51 In practical terms, the individual in question may be targeted (see infra Section C), even
when not personally linked to any specific hostile act-simply due to his membership in such a group-as long as that membership continues.
There is no doubt that the construct of direct participation in hostilities is not
open ended, and it "is far narrower than that of making a contrib ution to the war
effort."S2 Still, a whole range of activities can be identified as concrete examples of
direct participation in hostilities. As the Supreme Court of Israel expounded, these
include not only using firearms or gathering intelligence, but also acting as a guide
to combatants, and, most pointedly, masterminding such activities through recruitment or planning (in contradistinction to, e.g., merely donating money contrib utions or selling supplies to combatants: the latter activities do not come within
the ambit of direct participation in hostilities).53
Under Artide SO( 1) of Protocol I, " [iJn case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian."$4 The provision is particularly
germane to the issue of direct participation in hostilities. It is imperative to ensure
that military units tasked with the mission of winnowing out civilians who engage
in hostilities will not treat all civilians as targetable, "shooting first and asking questions later."%Additionally, the presence of civilians directly participating in hostilities among the civilian population does not deprive the population at large of the
protection from attack that it is entitled to.$6
The theme of direct participation in hostilities has been under study for a number of years bya group of experts under the aegis of the ICRe. While the study has
not yet been consummated, it has exposed a number of challenging questions and
has led to lengthy debates. One hotly contested point will be discussed infra in detail. But there is a host of thorny problems. By way of illustration, there are disputes
regarding the different degrees of civilian contribution to electronic warfare,
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ranging from the mere maintenance of military computers to playing the role of
the "man in the loop" guiding-perhaps from a great distance-a military unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or a CNA, with a view to causing death, destruction
or damage. There are also arguments concerning the roles of civilian contractors
who may offer purely logistical services (e.g., refueling military aircraft en route to
a far-away armed conflict) but may also be carrying out paramilitary missions
(such as guarding supply convoys) near the contact zone with the enemy.
C. Targeted Killings of Civilians Directly Participating in Hostilities

Hague Regulation 23(b ) forbids the treacherous killing of enemy individuals,57
and Article 37(1) of Additional Protocol I prohibits killing an adversary by resort
to perfidy (defined as an act inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to
believe that he is entitled to--or is obliged to accord-protection under the law of
international armed conflict, with an intent to betray that confidence).s8 However, when perfidy is not in play, even the JCRC Model Manual concedes that an
enemy individual combatant may be targeted (including a head of state who is the
commander-in-chief).59
There isa nexus between the question of whether a civilian is direct1yparticipating in hostilities and the issue of targeted killing. Logic dictates that, since a combatant may be individually targeted for attack, the same rule should apply to a
civilian who takes a direct part in hostilities (at such time as he is indulging in that
activity). But scholars like to debate the deceptively simple hypothetical scenario of
a civilian driving an ammunition truck to supply the armed forces. One view
(maintained by General A.P. V. Rogers) is that this will not result in the forfeiture of
civilian protection, although the presence of the civilian driver in the ammunition
truck-a palpable military objective-will put him at risk should the truck be attacked on his watch. 60 To fully perceive what is at issue, it is necessary to flesh out
the postulated sequence of events. Let us assume that the ammunition truck
reaches a gas station and the driver parks the truck, going into a mini-mart to purchase some refreshments. An enemy commando unit, lying in wait, is mounting an
attack during that exact time frame. The question is: can the commandos attack
only the ammunition truck (at its parking spot, which may be heavily guarded) or
can they also kill or neutralize the driver when he is by himself inside the minimart? General Rogers's position is dear cut: only the ammunition truck can be attacked. As soon as the driver detaches himself from the truck, he sheds the risk and
benefits from civilian protection. J (among others) disagree. We believe that it all
depends on whether the script unfolds in geographic proximity to the front line or
far away from it. If the location is at a great distance from the front line (say, in the
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continental United States while the fron t line is in Afghanistan), the driver remains
a civilian and runs a risk solely when he is in or near the ammunition truck. However, ifthe venue shifts and the ammunition truck is being driven in immediate logistical support of the military units deployed at the front line, the driver must be
considered a civilian directly participating in hostilities: he then loses protection
from attack even when he steps out of the truck. 6 1 In the Targeted Killings case, the
Supreme Court of Israel has clearly endorsed the latter view. 62
In occupied territories, there is a preliminary issue related to targeted killings of
civilians directly participating in hostilities, namely, whether the occupying power
is capable of taking effective law enforcement measures vis-a.-vis such persons in
lieu of slaying them. As President Barak stressed, detention of a person directly participating in hostilities against the occupying power is the preferred step, provided
that his arrest is feasible. ti3 1f detention is not a viable option, it must be recognized
that a civilian taking a direct part in hostilities risks his life-like any combatantand is exposed to a lethal attack. 64 Differently put, a strike targeting such a person-and killing him-is permissible when non-lethal measures are either unavailable or ineffective. tiS
Although the Supreme Court of Israel pronounced that a targeted killing of a
terrorist in an occupied territory (when detention is not feasible) is lawful, the
Court was adamant that whenever innocent civilians are present in the vicinity of
the targeted individual and they are likely to be injured, the principle of proportionality m ust be applied.66 The relevance of the principle of proportionality in the
setting of targeted killings has come to the fore in Israel, because of a highly publicized use of a one-ton bomb against a well-known Palestinian terrorist hiding in a
residential area. There is a growing public sentiment that such a massive bomb
should not have been used, since it was almost bound to cause excessive collateral
damage to civilian bystanders.
D. H uman Shields

This raises the cognate issue of the use of civilian "human shields" intended to lend
protection to combatants or military objectives. Article 28 of Geneva Convention
(IV) states that "[t]he presence ofa protected person may not be used to render
certain points or areas immune from military operations."67 For its part, Article
51(7) of Protocol I reads, in part, that "[t]he presence or movements of the civilian
population or individual civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas
immune from military operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield, favour or impede military operations."68 lrrefutably, the prohibition of the use of civilians as human shields mirrors customary
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internationallaw.69 Utilizing the presence of civilians or other protected persons to
render certain points, areas or military forces immune from military operations is
recognized as a war crime by Article 8(2)(b)(xxiii) of the Rome Statute.7o
It is incontrovertible that when combatants (including civilians directly participating in hostilities) surround themselves by civilians, this is a breach of the law of
international armed conflict. All the same, it is necessary to distinguish between
voluntary and involuntary human shields. As the Suprem e Court of Israel (per
President Barak) held in the Targeted Killings case, whereas involuntary hwnan
shields are victims, voluntary human shields are to be deemed civilians who take a
direct part in hostilities.'l That being the case, voluntary human shields are
targetable and, of course, they "are excluded in the estimation of incidental injury
when assessing proportionality. "72
What if, contrary to the law of international armed conflict, involuntary human
shields are actually compelJed to screen a military objective? Article 51 (8) of Protocol I sets forth that a violation of the prohibition of shielding military objectives
with civilians does not release a belligerent party from its legal obligations vis-a.-vis
the civilians. 73 What this means is that the principle of proportionality in attack remains in effect. I do not d en y that the principle of proportionality must still govern
the planning of an attack against a military objective screened by involuntary civilian human shields. However , in my opinion, the test of excessive injury to civilians
must be relaxed in such exceptional circumstances. That is to say, to my mind, the
appraisal of whether civilian casualties are excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated must make allowances for the fact that, by dint of the large (albeit involuntal)') presence of civilians at the site of the military objective, the
number of civilian casualties can be expected to be higher than usual. To quote
Louise Doswald-Beck, "[ t]he Israeli bombardm ent of Beirut in June and July o f
1982 resulted in high civilian casualties, but not necessarily excessively so given the
fact that the military targets were placed amongst the civilian population. "1~ This
approach is confirmed by the 2004 UK Manual on the Law ofArmed Conflict
Any violation by the enemy of this rule [the prohibition of human shields] would not
relieve the attacker of his respons ibility to take precautions to protect the civilians
aifC(:ted. but the enemy's unlawful activity may be taken into account in considering
whether the incidental loss or damage was proportionate to the military advantage
expected."

Custom ary in temationallaw is certainly more rigorous than Protocol I on this
point. It has traditionally been grasped that, should civilian casualties ensue from
an illegal attempt to shield a military objective, their blood will be on the hands of
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the belligerent party that abused them as human shields. 76 The long and the short
of it is that a belligerent party is not vested by the law of international armed conflict with the power to block an otherwise lawfuJ attack against military objectives
by deliberately placing civilians in harm's way.77
The prohibition of placing civilians as human shields around a military objective applies to all belligerent parties. Even though this has becom e a modus operandi
typical of terrorists, there are muJtiple ways in which reguJar armed forces may be
tempted to employ analogous tactics to facilitate military operations. The issue
arose before the Supreme Court of Israel (per President Barak), in 2006, in the
Early Warnitlgcase.78TheCourt had to determine the legality of an "Early Warning
Procedure" (adopted by the Israel Defense Forces (lOF)) whereby, when a terrorist
has been cornered and besieged, a local resident would be encouraged to volunteer
(provided that no harm to the messenger was anticipated) in order to relay a warning and a call to surrender so as to avoid unnecessary bloodshed. 79 The "Early
Warning Procedure" drew criticism from outside observers80 and it was nullified
by the Court. President Barak-relying on Article 28 of Geneva Convention (IV)
and on Article 51 (7) of Protocol I (although Israel is not a contracting party to Protocol I)-stressed that the IOF was not allowed to use protected persons as human
shields and that, therefore, the assistance of a local resident could certainly not be
required coercive1y.81 But what about assistance offered voluntarily in circumstances where this is not expected to place the person concerned in jeopardy? President Barak ruJed against the "Early Warning Procedure" on four grounds: (i)
protected persons must not be used as part of the military effort of the occupying
power, (ii) everything must be done to separate the civilian population from combat operations, (iii) voluntary consent in these circumstances is often suspect, and
(iv) it is not possible to tell in advance whether the activity of the protected person
puts him in danger.82
Generally speaking, President Barak's reasoning is persuasive. Yet, he d id not
explain why such assistance cannot be offered by a close relative---especially, a
mother or a father--{)f a terrorist besieged in a building that is about to be stormed
(with the likelihood of death in action of the terrorist), when the initiative is taken
by, for example, the parent who begs to be given a chance to persuade the besieged
son to surrender and save his life. 8) In such exceptional circumstances, there is little
if any danger to the life of the parent, and humanitarian considerations actually tip
the balance in favor of allowing the requested intercession to take place.
In conclusion, this article should show that, although the protection of civilians
is a basic tenet of the international law of armed conflict, a civilian cannot take that
protection for granted. There are many ways in which civilian protection will not
render practical assistance, and a civilian wouJd become a victim of war
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inadvertently (due to collateral damage). But, above all, civilian protection can be
lost if the person who purports to benefit from it crosses a red line by directly participating in hostilities. He may then be targeted, and this need not be done in an
anonymous fashion. Absent perfidy, the bullet that kills him may lawfully have his
name engraved on it.
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